From Symbol to Substance: Small Successes, Not Grandstanding, Can Legitimize KSA’s Ukraine Mediation Dream
By Irina Tsukerman
At first glance, the recent Jeddah summit bringing together, for the first time, 40 diverse countries, including India, China, and Brazil to address the Ukraine Peace Plan, is the pinnacle of diplomatic success for Saudi Arabia, which for over a year now, in public and private, expressed aspirations to mediate a resolution in the Russia-Ukraine war. Indeed, the optics were positive for Riyadh: coordinating such an undertaking presented an opportunity to take center stage in international diplomacy and to showcase a possibility of partnership with NATO on addressing the priority crisis to many of its members. Indeed in many ways, the summit met a number of interests and expectations in a relatively simple straight forward way.
First, it gave President Zelensky an opportunity to address a very mixed group of countries with conflicting agendas at the same time. Just getting the message out is a major success for Ukraine. Second, the summit concluded with an unanimous recognition of Ukraine’s sovereignty, which at least symbolically, gets its participants on the same page, even if there is not much else they can agree on. Third, for the United States, it is a major breakthrough in getting non-NATO, nonaligned, BRICS, and “Global South” countries to engage – a belated, first step which could eventually lead to more diplomatic successes. Most obviously, for Saudi Arabia, the summit was a demonstration of regional clout and one of the steps towards cementing a leading role in global diplomacy, particularly as a representative of GCC/Middle east. Indeed, in the days before and after the summit, Western media underscored the perception of KSA’s growing power resulting from hosting this summit in various articles which show that at least the general public may perceive the hosting of the summit as an underscoring the coveted seat at the table – if not leadership – around one of the world’s most discussed conflicts.
The reality is more complicated. Thus far, the summit appears to be high on symbolism, low on substance. Due to the very diversity of the large number of countries present, significant issues beyond some basic and theoretical agreement on the Ukraine sovereignty issue were out of question. Most of the discussions remain shrouded in mystery and silence from all involved. The meeting of the national security advisers presumably brought together international counterparts to discuss global security implications, but given the sheer number of moving parts involved, it is hard to imagine any major breakthrough could follow from just one meeting. The summit was an introductory session at best. Its relative significance can only be assessed in the aftermath, in evaluating the follow through. What that follow through will look like is unclear. So far, there appears to be an agreement to reconvene with a fall, possibly as a more serious undertaking. Whether KSA will once again host the gathering remains to be seen. But any progress at a future event requires behind-the-scenes work among the participants. If Saudi Arabia is serious about its aspirations as a mediator – not just a host – between Russia and Ukraine, it now has an opportunity to contribute more substantively.
Building on the existing process
Although significant differences exist among the various participants in the summit, all of them could be galvanized immediately for some aspect of the peace-building process. To build reputation as a serious, dedicated, and merit-driven interlocutor, Riyadh could facilitate better working relations by initiating and leading the implementation of various working group. For instance, the national security advisers could continue with calls and independent meetings to address ongoing and consequent regional and global security concerns, such as supply chain management, energy security, intelligence sharing, cybersecurity, and the role and involvement of PMCs and non-state actors in escalating the conflict. But other working groups could cater to broader and more diverse interests related to the peace plan, which include the diplomatic procedure management, Ukraine’s reconstruction, addressing humanitarian needs such as the refugee crisis and return, the grain deal and its impact, medical and psychological assistances/trauma management, education during the time of war and after, and ensuring protection and opportunities for various types of people. Some of the working groups could even include a process on integration of grassroots level interregional dialogue, or even discussion with various oppressed ethnic minorities in Russia and other conflict-affected post-Soviet countries.
The importance of all these arrangements is in having a hands-on involvement on essential processes that build to conflict management, resolution, and peace building and that allow KSA to play a key role independently, without ever being sidelined by some other party competing for power in the same space. Saudi Arabia does not need to wait for anyone to “assign” it the official role of a mediator; instead, the path to succeeding in this fields is getting down to practical details and becoming an active part of the process, showing interest, involvement, and understanding of interests and concerns involved. Expressing desire to do so in the media and in social media will not alone bring the Saudis the coveted role. However, the model for the practical applications of the Kingdom’s aspirations already exists.
POW Release
The Saudis rightfully took pride in the success of a hostage release, when the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly played a personal part in securing the repatriation of ten international prisoners of war, including American, who were captured in Ukraine by the Russian military. Indeed that level of direct interest involvement from leadership can lead to a lot of goodwill; however, the additional calls and conversations that preceded the Jeddah summit are not sufficient to establish Saudi Arabia in the role of an actively mediating party.
Instead, Riyadh should turn to the record of its growing relations with Ukraine – such as defense related purchases made before the war, and Ukraine’s participation in the Saudi arms show last year – to create a space for closer cooperation and coordination with both Ukraine and NATO on a variety of logistical and strategic issues. Saudi Arabia has gotten a lot of flack since the breakout of the hostilities for its alleged closeness to the Kremlin; in reality, despite the fact that some in Saudi Arabia have indeed invested in Russia’s energy sector even before the war, the Crown Prince’s instincts have been pro-Western, following the decades of KSA’s close relationship with the West and its strongly anti-communist direction.
While as any country, the Kingdom will pursue policies most beneficial to its interests, there needs not be a one-sided perception of a pro-Putin pivot. Instead, if Riyadh wishes to be acknowledges as a leading power in the mediation of major conflicts outside the Middle East, it should reinvest into the relationships with those countries most concerned by the turn of events in Ukraine and engage with them, publicly and privately, on related issues that will qualm the outrage and concern over the appearances of the growing Russian influence. Working with Ukraine and Eastern Europe on the resolution of the grain distribution dilemma would be one such possible opening that could help build up the credibility for more significant involvement in bigger related political issues. Moreover, more frequent personal presence by the Crown Prince at related events could allay the fears that this summit was not a serious effort by Saudi Arabia but merely a PR stunt. However, if the Crown Prince himself were to repeat his success with the POW release, whether by direct involvement in helping resolve various smaller crises, or by being more visible in more frequent events related to Ukraine, that would establish that Saudi Arabia’s involvement is not merely a choreographed performance to impress, but rather a substantive, dedicated effort with the leadership of the very person whose Vision2030 has gained the renown of its orientation towards peace and regional integration. In other words, if Saudi Arabia wants to be credited with breakthroughs in diplomacy, it needs to work for it. The tools to be successful are already at the Kingdom’s disposal.
NATO Is Eager to Expand The Involvement of Non-Western Countries on the Ukraine Peace Process
Despite Riyadh’s complex relationship with the Biden Administration, Saudi Arabia’s greater and more concerted engagement on the Ukraine Peace Process would be a huge boost to the Kingdom, as leverage in any major negotiation with the United States, as well as in terms of gaining NATO support regarding its own political and security interests. While the current line in Riyadh is to maintain visible neutrality in the conflict and to negotiate on relatively minor matters from that position, there is a potential for more direct bridge building on regional matters as part of the negotiating process on Ukraine. The Biden administration’s position has been to try to tie the Ukraine Peace Process into a somewhat opaque Grand Strategy that also involves the much-hyped rumors on the Saudi-Israel normalization process, Iran’s integration in the region and much else.
Most of these issues do not work well together at all. However, Saudi Arabia could potentially agree to play a greater role in pushing its neighbors into a more positive role on Ukraine and less lopsided positions regarding Russia on a practical level (beyond talk at the summit) in exchange for clear, specific, and realistic requests concerning security issues in the Middle East. The Biden administration is not likely to agree to a full defense treaty or to a participation in the civilian nuclear program for Saudi benefit, but it could potentially reconsider some of the previous US commitments in the Middle East that had been taken away over time starting with the Obama administration. This realpolitik approach may be the most practical way of managing expectations and complicated international relationships at the current juncture. Saudi Arabia then could then gain international clout that would also serve it well in geopolitical and economic rivalries with other countries in the region.
There has been a growing concern about KSA’s signaling of a strategic shift away from Washington and its allies – ranging from the role China’s Huawei I playing in its telecommunications, to its applications to join BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, all seen not as “balancing” but as hostile moves by many in the Western circles. To balance out these developments, there is a potential for a different alliance focused on Ukraine-related diplomacy and various economic issues and global and regional concerns, that could be used to bring East and West together and help build understanding of each other’s security and geopolitical positions and concerns and bridge the gaps in relations. An East-West working group would give Riyadh an opportunity to showcase its diplomatic skill in expanding in-depth and long-term discussions with the Global South.
Can KSA Succeed Where Washington Has Failed?
One specific smaller issue where KSA’s assistance would very much be appreciated by all involved is using its unique position – as a recently normalized counterpart to Iran – to persuade the Islamic Republic to limit its military support to Russia, which is consistently using Iranian missiles and drones to target Ukrainians, including civilians. Iran considers its partnership with Russia strong and justifiable against the West, but KSA could position itself as a party seeking to diminish tensions. After all, Iran and Russia have likewise been historical rivals, and only recent events have brought Tehran and Moscow as close politically in public as we see. There is over a century worth of geopolitical and territorial tensions, most recently linked to the unequitable division of the Caspian resources. While in the short Iran and Russia may see eye-to-eye in undermining Europe through military operations, positioning itself too close to Russia brings Iran few practical benefits – and sooner or later, its joint weapons manufacturing facilities in Moscow will become a legitimate target for attacks.
If Saudi Arabia is serious about regional peacebuilding and improving its own relations with Tehran, using its influence to prevent the facilitation of needless aggression could be a major benefit to its image. Even if the bid fails, just by taking an initiative on this issue, KSA could earn itself a seat at the table in many other unrelated diplomatic efforts. Such an effort to prevent bloodshed and to protect civilians in Ukraine from targeting could go a long way to getting Riyad invited to the more prestigious international gatherings where it seeks entry and leadership. There is also another element of self-interest in this undertaking; the missiles and drones supplied to Russia could eventually find themselves in the hands of various militias and proxies, make their way in the Middle East, and end up being used by various terrorist factions that can endanger Saudi security much the same way the old Soviet weapons and mines ended up being used by the Houthis in Yemen. Stopping the proliferation of Iranian weapons could save lives in the Middle East just as much as in Ukraine.
Saudi Arabia appears to be at the start of an exciting and potentially meaningful process. The diplomatic doors are opening; all Riyadh needs to do is walk in, rather than stop at the entry. Riyadh’s ambition to be a mediator on Ukraine issues may seem unlikely to transpire due to Saudi Arabia’s sheer distance from the conflicts and from the interests involved. However, these interests – and understanding of them – could be developed and KSA could yet play a much bigger and meaningful role if it puts aside a fixation on optics and appearances, and instead commits to building up a meaningful diplomatic presence.
